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1. We have the Technology   
 
In a widely reported article published recently in Science (Sparrow et al., 2011), a 
series of experimental results were described which together indicate that, in an era 
of laptops, tablets, and smartphones that come armed with powerful Internet search 
engines, our organic brains often tend to internally store not the information about a 
topic, but rather how to find that information using the available technology.  
For example, in one experiment the participants were each instructed to type, into a 
computer, forty trivia statements that might ordinarily be found online (e.g. ‚An 
ostrich’s eye is bigger than its brain‛). Half the participants were told that their 
typed statements would be saved on the computer and half were told that their 
typed statements would be deleted. Within each of these groups, half of the 
individuals concerned were asked explicitly to try to remember the statements 
(where ‘remember’ signals something like ‘store in your brains’). All the participants 
were then asked to write down as many of the statements as they could remember. 
The results were intriguing.  The fact of whether or not a participant was asked to 
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remember the target statements had no significant effect on later recall, but the steer 
about whether or not the statements would be saved on the computer did, with 
superior recall demonstrated by those participants who believed that their typed 
statements had been deleted.  In other words, where the expectation is that 
information will be readily available via technology, people tend not to store that 
information internally. Further studies provided participants in the saved condition 
with additional information indicating where on the computer the saved statements 
were being stored (e.g., folder names). This scenario uncovered a more complex 
profile of organic memory allocation, suggesting that people don’t internally store 
where to find externally stored items of information when they have internally 
stored the items themselves, but that they do internally store where to find 
externally stored items of information when they have not internally stored the 
items themselves. There is some evidence, then, that ‚when people expect 
information to remain continuously available (such as we expect with Internet 
access), we are more likely to remember where to find it than we are to remember 
the details of the item‛ (Sparrow et al. 2011, p.3).   
 
Predictably, during the reporting of these experimental results, even the serious 
media couldn’t resist engaging in some mild fear-mongering about the technology-
driven degeneration of human intelligence. For instance, even though the British 
newspaper The Guardian published an article whose main text conveyed an accurate 
impression of the research in question, the piece invited some familiar contemporary 
anxieties, by virtue of its arguably sensationalist title, ‘Poor Memory? Blame Google’ 
(Magill, 2011).  Such negative spin, it must be said, runs largely contrary to the 
experimenters’ own interpretation of their results, in which one finds the more 
uplifting thought that what we have here is ‛an adaptive use of memory‛ in which 
‚the computer and online search engines *should be counted+ as an external memory 
system that can be accessed at will‛ (Sparrow et al. 2011, p.3). Nevertheless, one can 
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certainly see how the revealed pattern of remembering might be treated as evidence 
of some sort of reduction in overall cognitive achievement.   
 
Thinking clearly about these sorts of issues requires (among other things, no doubt) 
a combination of historical perspective and philosophical precision concerning how 
we understand the technological embedding of our naked organic intelligence. The 
necessary historical perspective is nicely captured by Andy Clark’s memorable 
description of human beings as natural born cyborgs (Clark 2003). What this phrase 
reminds us is that although it is tempting to think of our cognitive symbiosis with 
technology as being a consequence, as opposed to merely a feature, of a world 
populated by clever computational kit, that would be to ignore the following fact: it 
is of our very nature as evolved and embodied cognitive creatures to create tools 
which support and enhance our raw organic intelligence by dovetailing with our 
brains and bodies to form shifting human-artefact coalitions operating over various 
time-scales. This is no less true of our engagement with the abacus, the book or the 
slide-rule than it is of our engagement with the laptop, the tablet or the smartphone.  
We are, and always have been, dynamically assembled organic-technological 
hybrids – systems in which a squishy brain routinely sits at the centre of causal loops 
that incorporate not only non-neural bodily structures and movements, but also 
external, technological props and scaffolds: technologies are, it seems, (part of) us.  
 
The claim that technologies are (part of) us might seem like a metaphorical  flourish 
– or worse, a desperate attempt at a sound-bite – but I mean it literally, and that’s 
where the philosophical precision comes in. We need to distinguish between two 
different views one might adopt hereabouts. According to the first, sometimes called 
the embodied-embedded account of mind, intelligent behaviour is regularly, and 
sometimes necessarily, causally dependent on the bodily exploitation of certain 
external props or scaffolds. For example, many of us solve difficult multiplication 
problems through the exploitation of pen and paper. Here, a beyond-the-skin factor 
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helps to transform a difficult cognitive problem into a set of simpler ones. 
Nevertheless, for the embodied-embedded theorist, even if it is true that one could 
not have solved the overall problem without using pen and paper, the pen-and-
paper resource retains the status of an external aid to some internally located 
thinking system. It does not qualify as a proper part of the thinking system itself. 
Thus, the thinking itself remains a resolutely inner phenomenon, even though it is 
given a performance boost by its local technological ecology. (The case for 
embodied-embedded cognition in its various forms has been made over and over 
again. For two philosophical treatments that stress the kind of interactive causal 
coupling just described, see (Clark 1997, Wheeler 2005).) 
 
The second view in this vicinity takes a more radical step. According to the extended 
cognition hypothesis (henceforth ExC), there are actual (in this world) cases of 
intelligent action in which thinking and thoughts (more precisely, the material 
vehicles that realize thinking and thoughts) are spatially distributed over brain, body 
and world, in such a way that the external (beyond-the-skin) factors concerned are 
rightly accorded cognitive status. Here, the term ‘cognitive status’ tags whatever 
status it is that we ordinarily grant to the brain in mainstream scientific explanations 
of psychological phenomena. For the extended cognition theorist, then, the coupled 
combination of pen-and-paper resource, appropriate bodily manipulations, and in-
the-head processing counts as a cognitive system in its own right, a system in which 
although the differently located elements make different causal contributions to the 
production of the observed intelligent activity, nevertheless each of those 
contributions enjoys a fully cognitive status.  It is this more radical view that will 
concern us here. (The canonical presentation of ExC is by Clark and Chalmers (1998). 
Clark’s own recent defence of the view can be found in (Clark 2008b). For a timely 
collection that places the original Clark and Chalmers paper alongside a range of 
developments, criticisms and defences, see (Menary 2010).) 
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In the next section, I shall present an introduction to the basic shape of (one 
prominent form of) ExC. My primary aim in the paper as a whole, however, is not to 
explicate in detail, or to argue for the truth of, ExC.  Rather, it is to explore ExC in 
relation to two socially charged issues that ask questions of us and about us in our 
contemporary human lives. Those issues are: (i) how we should teach our children in 
an increasingly wired, wireless and networked world (our opening example of 
strategic memory allocation will be relevant again here); and (ii) how we should 
conceptualize our relationship with so-called intelligent architecture. Put more 
succinctly, I am going to say something about educating and building, from the 
standpoint of extended cognition.   
 
2. The Functionalist Route to Extended Cognition 
 
One of the things that has always struck me about ExC is the fact that although most 
philosophers and cognitive scientists tend to greet the view (at first anyway) with a 
mixture of consternation and scepticism, the possibility that it might be true is 
actually a straightforward consequence of what, despite the inevitable dissenting 
voices, probably still deserves to be called the house philosophy in cognitive science, 
namely functionalism. In general terms, the cognitive-scientific functionalist holds 
that what matters when one is endeavouring to identify the specific contribution of a 
state or process qua cognitive is not the material constitution of that state or process, 
but rather the functional role which it plays in generating cognitive phenomena, by 
intervening causally between systemic inputs, systemic outputs and other 
functionally identified, intrasystemic states and processes.  Computational 
explanations of mental phenomena, as pursued in, say, most areas of cognitive 
psychology and artificial intelligence, are functionalist explanations, in this sense.   
 
A note for the philosophers out there: I have avoided depicting functionalism as a 
way of specifying the constitutive criteria that delineate the mental states that figure 
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in our pretheoretical commonsense psychology, e.g., as a way of specifying what it is 
for a person to be in pain, as we might ordinarily think of that phenomenon. This 
philosophical project, laudable as it was, has faced powerful criticisms over many 
years (for an introduction to the main lines of argument, see e.g. Levin 2010). 
However, even if that particular functionalist project is now doomed to failure, the 
status of functionalist thinking within cognitive science remains largely unaffected. 
Good evidence for this resistance to contamination is provided by the fact that 
disciplines such as artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology have not ground 
to a halt in the light of the widely acknowledged difficulties with the traditional 
philosophical project. The underlying reason for the resistance, however, is that 
function-based scientific explanations of psychological phenomena – explanations 
which turn on the functional contributions of various material vehicles in physically 
realizing such phenomena – do not depend on giving functional definitions of those 
phenomena  (for a closely related point, see Chalmers 2008, p.xv).  
 
What all this indicates is that, if functionalism is true, then the hypothesis of 
extended cognition is certainly not conceptually confused, although of course it may 
still be empirically false.  On just a little further reflection, however, it might seem 
that there must be something wrong about this claim, since historically the 
assumption has been that the cognitive economy of functionally identified states and 
processes that the functionalist takes to be a mind will be realized by the nervous 
system (or, in hypothetical cases of minded robots or aliens, whatever the 
counterpart of the nervous system inside the bodily boundaries of those cognitive 
agents turns out to be). In truth, however, there isn’t anything in the letter of 
functionalism as a generic philosophical framework that mandates this exclusive 
focus on the inner (Wheeler 2010a, b).  After all, what the functionalist schema 
demands of us is that we specify the causal relations that exist between some target 
element and a certain set of systemic inputs, systemic outputs and other functionally 
identified, intrasystemic elements. There is no essential requirement that the 
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boundaries of the system of interest must fall at the organic sensory-motor interface. 
In other words, in principle at least, functionalism straightforwardly allows for the 
existence of cognitive systems whose borders are located at least partly outside the 
skin, hence Clark’s term extended functionalism (Clark 2008a, b; see also Wheeler 
2010a, b, 2011a).   
 
One pay-off from developing ExC in a functionalist register is that it gives the ExC 
theorist something she needs – assuming, that is, that she wants to call on one of the 
archetypal supporting arguments for the view, the argument from parity. Here is 
Clark’s recent formulation of the so-called parity principle. 
 
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process 
which, were it to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in 
accepting as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is 
(for that time) part of the cognitive process. (Clark 2008b, p.77, drawing 
on Clark and Chalmers 1998, p.8) 
  
As stated, the parity principle depends on the notion of multiple realizability, the idea 
that a single type of mental state or process may enjoy a range of different material 
instantiations. To see the connection, we need to be clear about how the parity 
principle works. It encourages us to imagine that exactly the same functional states 
and processes which are realized in the actual world by certain externally located 
physical elements are in fact realized by certain internally located physical elements. 
Having done this, if we then judge that the internal realizing elements in question 
count as part of a genuinely cognitive system, we must conclude that so did the 
external realizing elements in the environment-involving, distributed case. After all, 
by hypothesis, nothing about the functional contribution of the target elements to 
intelligent behaviour has changed. All that has been varied is the spatial location of 
those elements. And if someone were to claim that being shifted inside the head is 
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alone sufficient to result in a transformation in status , from non-cognitive to 
cognitive, he would, it seems, be guilty of begging the question against ExC.   
 
So that’s how the parity principle works. Its dependence on multiple realizability 
becomes visible (Wheeler 2011a) once one notices that the all-important judgment of 
parity is based on the claim that it is possible for the very same cognitive state or 
process to be available in two different generic formats – one non-extended and one 
extended. Thus, in principle at least, that state or process must be realizable in either 
a purely organic medium or in one that involves an integrated combination of 
organic and non-organic structures. In other words, it must be multiply realizable. 
So, if we are to argue for cognitive extension by way of parity considerations, the 
idea that cognitive states and processes are multiply realizable must make sense.  
Now, one of the first things undergraduate students taking philosophy of mind 
classes get taught is that functionalism provides a conceptual platform for securing 
multiple realizability. Because a function is something that enjoys a particular kind 
of independence from its implementing material substrate, a function must, in 
principle, be multiply realizable, even if, in this world, only one kind of material 
realization happens to exist for that function. 
 
Of course, even among the fans of ExC, not everyone is enamoured by the parity 
principle (see e.g. Menary 2007, Sutton 2010), and those who remain immune to its 
charms are often somewhat contemptuous of the functionalist route to ExC, but 
that’s a domestic skirmish that can be left for another day. What cannot be ignored 
right now is the fact that neither the parity principle, nor functionalism, nor even the 
two of them combined, can carry the case for ExC. What is needed, additionally, is 
an account of which functional contributions count as cognitive contributions and 
which don’t. After all, as the critics of ExC have often observed, there will 
undoubtedly be some functional differences between extended cognitive systems (if 
such things exist) and purely inner cognitive systems. So, faced with the task of 
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deciding some putative case of parity, we will need to know which, if any, of those 
functional differences matter. In other words, we need to provide what Adams and 
Aizawa (2008) have dubbed a mark of the cognitive.  
 
Even though I ultimately come out on the opposite side to Adams and Aizawa in the 
dispute over whether or not ExC is true, and even though (relatedly) I am inclined to 
dispute the precise mark of the cognitive that Adams and Aizawa advocate (a matter 
that I will not pursue here, but see Wheeler online draft manuscript, chapter 4), I 
take it that we fundamentally agree on the broad philosophical shape that any 
plausible candidate for such a mark would need to take. A mark of the cognitive will 
be a scientifically informed account of what it is to be a proper part of a cognitive 
system that, so as not to beg any crucial questions, is fundamentally independent of 
where any candidate element happens to be spatially located (Wheeler 2010a, b, 
2011a, b). Once such an account is given, further philosophical and empirical leg-
work will be required to find out where cognition (so conceived) falls – in the brain, 
in the non-neural body, in the environment, or, as ExC predicts will sometimes be 
the case, in a system that extends across all of these aspects of the world.  
 
So that no one ends up feeling cheated, I should point out that nowhere in the 
present treatment do I specify in detail what the precise content of an ExC-
supporting mark of the cognitive might be. (For more on that issue, see e.g. (Wheeler 
2011a).) In relation to the present task of sketching functionalist-style ExC, I am 
interested only in the fact that the extended functionalist needs such a mark, in order 
to determine which functional differences matter when making judgments about 
parity. That said, it is worth noting that the later arguments of this paper turn on a 
number of factors (including, for instance, functional and informational integration, 
and a property that I shall call ‘dynamic reliability’), that are likely to feature, when 
the necessary content is filled in.      
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The demand that any mark of the cognitive be scientifically informed reflects the 
point made earlier, that the functionalism that matters for ExC is the functionalism 
of cognitive science, not the functionalism that (some have argued – again, see 
above) characterizes commonsense psychology. In this context it is interesting to 
respond briefly to an argument due to Clark, to the effect that the fan of ExC should 
shun the idea of a mark of the cognitive (as I have characterized it), in favour of ‚our 
rough sense of what we might intuitively judge to belong to the domain of 
cognition‛ (Clark 2008b, p.114). According to this view, judgments about whether or 
not some distributed behaviour-shaping system counts as an extended cognitive 
system should be driven not by any scientific account of cognition, since such 
accounts are standardly ‚in the grip of a form of theoretically loaded neurocentrism‛ 
(Clark 2008b, p.105), but rather by our everyday, essentially prescientific sense what 
counts as cognitive, since the ‚folk *i.e., commonsense+ grip on mind and mental 
states< is surprisingly liberal when it comes to just about everything concerning 
machinery, location, and architecture‛ (Clark 2008b, p.106). Clark’s claim strikes me 
as wrong (see Wheeler 2011b for detailed discussion). Indeed, there is good reason to 
think that the ordinary attributive practices of the folk presume the within-the-skin 
internality of cognition. Here is an example that makes the point. If an 
environmental protester had stolen the plans of Heathrow Terminal 5, in advance of 
the terminal being built, the folk would most likely have been interested, and either 
supportive of the act or outraged by it, depending on what other beliefs were in 
play. But presumably none of these attitudes would be held because the folk were 
considering the whereabouts of (to speak loosely) part of Richard Rogers’ mind 
(example taken from Wheeler 2011b).  
 
We have now taken a brief stroll down the functionalist route to extended cognition 
and have highlighted (what I have argued are) three building blocks of that version 
of ExC – functionalism itself, the parity principle, and the mark of the cognitive. So, 
with ExC-functionalism-style in better view, we can now turn our attention to those 
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two aforementioned areas of contemporary life within which, I think, the notion of 
extended cognition has the potential to make itself felt, namely educating and 
building. My all-too-brief reflections on these issues are, of course, essentially those 
of the concerned citizen, since I am certainly no educational theorist and no architect. 
Like all philosophers, however, I feel I have the inalienable right to go wading 
around in other people’s disciplines, although in my case I hope without any 
imperialistic tendencies. My humble goal is only to help open up what may turn out 
to be fruitful dialogues.  So, with that goal in mind, let’s begin with education.  
 
3. Educating Extended Minds 
 
Consider the following list of existing and potential examples of performance-
enhancing technology that might be used in educational contexts: pen and paper; 
slide rules; limited capability generic calculators that have not been loaded with any 
personalized applications; restricted Internet access; largely unrestricted Internet 
access including the use of sophisticated search engines; the learners’ own 
smartphones; sophisticated Internet search engines mainlined into the learners’ 
brains via neural implants. (It might seem that the final example here is pure science 
fantasy, and maybe it is, but it is something that has at least been discussed 
hypothetically at Google. As Google's CEO Eric Schmidt mischievously reports in a 
2009 interview (http://techcrunch.com/2009/09/03/google-ceo-eric-schmidt-on-the-
future-of-search-connect-it-straight-to-your-brain/, last accessed 11 October 2011): 
‚Sergey *Brin, co-founder of Google] argues that the correct thing to do is to just 
connect it [Google] straight to your brain. In other words, you know, wire it into 
your head.‛)  Given this list, we might echo some fears broached earlier, and ask 
ourselves the following question: assuming that, on average, overall behavioural 
performance will be better when the proficient use of technology is in place, does 
our list describe a slippery slope that marks the creeping degeneration of human 
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intelligence or a progressive incline that shows our species the way to new cognitive 
heights? 
 
One way of focussing the issue here is to ask under what conditions our children’s 
intelligence should be formally examined, since, presumably, anyone who thinks 
that a cognitive reliance on increasingly sophisticated computational technology 
signals a degeneration of human intelligence will have a tendency not to want to see 
such technology readily allowed in examination halls. There is no doubt that, in 
some performance-testing contexts, we judge the use of performance-enhancing 
technology to be a kind of cheating. Sport provides obvious instances. Here is one 
illustrative case.  (Thanks to Andy Clark for suggesting this example to me.)  Body-
length swimsuits that improve stability and buoyancy, while reducing drag to a 
minimum, were outlawed by swimming’s governing body FINA (Fédération 
Internationale de Natation) after the 2009 World Championships. In an earlier 
judgment that banned only some suits, but was later extended to include all body-
length suits, FINA stated that it ‚*wished+ to recall the main and core principle that 
swimming is a sport essentially based on the physical performance of the athlete‛ 
(quote retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/olympic_games/7944084.stm/, 
last accessed 11 October 2011). One might try to export this sort of principle to our 
target case by arguing that ‘education is a process essentially based on the unaided 
cognitive performance of the learner’, with ‘unaided’ here understood as ruling out 
the exploitation of external technological resources. (The case of neural implants that 
enable mainline Google access is tricky to categorize, since such devices, although 
not of course the servers that they would access, would be located inside the 
cognizer’s skin. To push on, let’s just stipulate that neural implants count as external 
on the grounds that they are technological enhancements to organic intelligence.) On 
the basis of our exported principle, any technology that enhances the performance of 
the naked brain would be banned from the examination hall, although of course 
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there would be no prohibition on the deployment of such technology as a kind of 
useful brain-training scaffold to be withdrawn ahead of the examination.  
 
The foregoing reasoning is, of course, too simple in form. One complication is that 
we already partly test our children by way of research projects and other longer-
term assignments that require the use of sophisticated computational technology, 
especially the Internet. Acknowledging this point, one might say that the question 
that concerns us at present is whether or not we should allow the same sort of 
technology to be used in all formal examinations. Here one might note that the 
combination of pen and paper already counts as a performance-enhancing 
technology that enables us to solve cognitive problems that our naked brains 
couldn’t (see, for example, my earlier example of the way such technology figures in 
mathematical reasoning). Given the extra thought that the kind of contemporary 
technology that currently excites our interest is, in essence, just more of the 
performance-enhancing same (although of course much fancier in what it enables us 
to do), one might argue that we already have an affirmative answer to our question. 
The moot point, of course, is whether or not the path from pen and paper to 
smartphones and beyond is smoothly continuous or involves some important 
conceptual transition in relation to the matter at hand. In this context, another 
observation becomes relevant, namely that other examples of technology that appear 
earlier on (intuitively, at the less sophisticated end of) our list (e.g. generic 
calculators) are already allowed in examination halls, at least for certain papers. The 
fact that some technology is already deployed under examination conditions points 
to the existence of difficult issues about where on our list of performance-enhancing 
kit the transition from the permissible to the impermissible occurs, and about why 
that transition happens precisely where it does. As we shall see, such issues prompt 
further questions that receive interesting and controversial answers in the vicinity of 
ExC.      
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Many factors are no doubt potentially relevant to the kinds of issues just mentioned, 
some of which are not specific to the exploitation of the kind of external technology 
with which we are concerned. For example, I suspect (without, admittedly, having 
done any research beyond asking a few friends and colleagues) that many people 
(educationalists and the general public alike) would want to prohibit the use of some 
(hypothetical) genetically-tailored-to-the-individual synthetic cognitive booster pill 
taken just before an exam, but would want to allow the use of a performance-
enhancing generic natural health supplement taken over many months, even if those 
two strategies had exactly the same outcome for the learner concerned (same grade, 
no ill effects on health, etc.). One thought that might be at work here (a thought that 
also seems to figure in questions of doping in sport) is that taking the long-term 
natural health supplement is, as its name suggests, a natural way of improving 
intellectual performance, whereas taking the immediate-effect tailored synthetic pill 
is an artificial prop. But whatever purchase this kind of thinking might have in the 
supplement-or-pill case, it seems questionable when we turn to the use of external 
technology such as search engines and smartphones, or at least it does if we view 
things from the standpoint of ExC. In actual fact, it already looks dubious from the less 
radical standpoint of embodied-embedded cognition, let alone ExC. That’s because, 
according to both positions, human beings are (to recall once again Clark’s phrase) 
natural born cyborgs. We have evolved to be (ExC), or to engage in (embodied-
embedded view), shifting human-artefact coalitions operating over various time-
scales. But if we really are natural born cyborgs, then the utilization of technology to 
enhance cognitive performance is as natural a feature of human existence as 
digestion or having children, so, on the suggested criterion, such utilization would 
fall on the permissible side of the divide.          
 
It is possible, however, that the supplement-or-pill example introduces a different 
sort of consideration, namely whether or not the technology in question is generic 
(available in the same form to all, like the natural health supplement) or 
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individualized (tailored to the individual, like the synthetic pill). Using this 
distinction as a way of cutting the cake, one might argue that generic technology 
(e.g. unrestricted Internet access via a shared search engine) is permissible in an 
exam setting, but individualized technology (e.g. the learner’s own smartphone, 
loaded with personally organized information) isn’t. Once again, however, the truth 
of ExC would cast doubt on the proposed reasoning. One factor that will plausibly 
play a role in determining whether or not a particular external element is judged to 
be a proper part of an extended cognitive architecture is the functional and 
informational integration of that element with the other elements concerned, 
including of course those located in the brain. This integration will depend partly on 
the extent to which some external element is configured so as to interlock seamlessly 
with the desires, preferences and other personality traits that are realized within the 
rest of the cognitive system, a system which, of course, according to the ExC theorist, 
may itself be extended.  
 
For example, compare a mobile application that recommends music to you purely on 
the basis of genre allocations with one whose recommendations are shaped by an 
evolving model not only of the kinds of purchases that you, as an individual, have 
made, but also of various psychological, emotional, political, and aesthetic patterns 
that your music-buying and other ongoing behaviour instantiates. It seems that, if a 
suite of additional conditions were in place (e.g. real-time access of the applications when 
needed, a reliable pattern of largely uncritical dependence on the recommendations 
made), then the individualization demonstrated by the second program raises the 
chances that it deserves to be counted part of your cognitive system (as partly 
realizing some of your beliefs and desires). But if that is right, then, from the 
standpoint of ExC, it is hard to see how the individual tailoring of an item of 
technology can be a sufficient reason to prohibit the use of that item in an 
examination. Such tailoring will, if other conditions are met, be part of an evidential 
package which (to employ what is, perhaps, an overly crude formulation) indicates 
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that the technology in question counts as part of the learner’s mind, and surely we want 
to allow that into the examination hall. From the standpoint of ExC, then, there 
seems to be no good reason based purely on individualization to ban sophisticated 
personal technology such as smartphones from any examination hall. 
 
In response to this, someone might point out that our current examination rules, 
which sometimes allow certain items of technology (e.g. generic calculators) to be 
used in examination halls, are the result of context-dependent decisions regarding 
what it is that we are testing for. Thus using a calculator might qualify as cheating in 
one sort of mathematics examination (in which we are testing for basic mathematical 
abilities), but be perfectly acceptable in another (in which we are testing for a more 
advanced application of mathematical reasoning).  Although this might well be true, 
it seems, at first sight, that the ExC-driven reasoning that makes it acceptable to 
utilize those items of technology that achieve cognitive status, because they are 
dynamically integrated into the right sorts of causal loops, will enjoy a priority over 
any decisions based on the content of particular exams. After all, to replay the point 
made just a few sentences ago, from the standpoint of ExC, the technology in 
question has been incorporated into the learner’s cognitive architecture (crudely, it is 
part of her mind), and that is the very ‘thing’, it seems, that we are endeavouring to 
examine.  
 
Once again, however, things are not quite so simple. This becomes clear once we 
recognize that the supporter of ExC will be driven to ask a slightly different question 
to ‘What are we testing for?’. She will want to ask, ‘What are we testing?’. To see 
why this is, recall the parity driven argument for ExC and the accompanying 
commitment to multiple realizability.  These indicate that, for ExC as I have 
characterized it, the same type-identified psychological state or process, as specified 
functionally, will often be realizable in either a purely organic medium or in one that 
involves an integrated combination of organic and non-organic structures. So 
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nothing in ExC rules out the idea that cognition may sometimes be a wholly internal 
affair, which means that nothing in ExC rules out the further idea that even though a 
person’s cognitive system is sometimes extended, we might sometimes want to test 
the performance of her cognitive capacities under non-extended conditions. In other 
words, sometimes, we might still want to test the naked brain rather than the 
organic-technological hybrid. Where this is the case, we will want to ban the use of 
technology from the examination hall. 
 
That said, one needs to be clear about what the motivation might be for testing the 
unadorned inner. After all, the experimental results described at the beginning of 
this paper indicate that when learners expect information to be readily and reliably 
available from an external resource (such as the Internet), they are more likely to 
remember where to find that information than the details of the information itself. 
This cognitive profile seems entirely appropriate for a world in which the skill of 
being able to find, in real time, the right networked information (not just facts, but 
information about how to solve problems) is arguably more important than being 
able to retain such information in one’s organic memory. In such a world, which is 
our world, the brain emerges as a locus of adaptive plasticity, a control system for 
embodied skills and capacities that enable the real-time recruitment and divestment 
of technology in problem-solving scenarios. As such, and from the standpoint of 
ExC, the brain is most illuminatingly conceptualized as one element – albeit the core 
persisting element – in sequences of dynamically constructed and temporarily 
instantiated extended cognitive systems. Perhaps what we ought to focus on, then, is 
the education of those hybrid assemblages, a focus which is entirely consistent with 
the goal of endowing the brain with the skills it needs to be an effective contributor 
to such assemblages. From this perspective, of course, there are extremely good 
reasons to support the increased presence of technology in the examination hall. 
Moreover, it should be clear that, if ExC is right, then the list of technological 
entanglements within educational contexts with which we began this section reflects 
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not the gradual demise of human intelligence in the age of clever computational kit, 
but rather our ongoing evolution as the organic-technological hybrids that we are, 
and that we have always been.   
 
4. Dwellers on the Threshold 
 
‚I go up,‛ said the elevator, ‚or down.‛ 
‚Good,‛ said Zaphod, ‚We're going up.‛ 
‚Or down,‛ the elevator reminded him. 
‚Yeah, OK, up please.‛ 
There was a moment of silence. 
‚Down's very nice,‛ suggested the elevator hopefully. 
‚Oh yeah?‛ 
‚Super.‛ 
‚Good,‛ said Zaphod, ‚Now will you take us up?‛ 
‚May I ask you,‛ inquired the elevator in its sweetest, most reasonable voice, ‚if 
you've considered all the possibilities that down might offer you?‛ 
 
Conversation between Zaphod Beeblebrox and an elevator designed by the Sirius Cybernetics 
Corporation, from The Restaurant at the End of the Universe by Douglas Adams. (I have 
stolen the use of this quotation from (Haque 2006). )   
  
Increasingly, architects will be designing buildings that, via embedded 
computational systems, are able to autonomously modify the spatial and cognitive 
environments of the people dwelling within them, in the light of what those 
buildings ‘believe’ about the needs, goals and desires of the people concerned. In 
other words, we are about to enter an era of intelligent architecture. Given our present 
concerns, the advent of such buildings invites the following question, for which I 
shall try to provide a preliminary answer: what is the relationship between ExC and 
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the way in which we understand and conceptualize our cognitive relationships with 
intelligent buildings?  
 
To focus our attention, let’s get clearer about the intelligent architecture concept, and 
illustrate it with some examples. After a careful survey and analysis, Sherbini and 
Krawczyk (2004, p.150) define an intelligent  building as one ‚that has the ability to 
respond (output) on time according to processed information that is measured and 
received from exterior and interior environments by multi-input information 
detectors and sources to achieve users’ needs and with the ability to learn‛. Notice 
that Sherbini and Krawczyk’s definition includes the requirement that the building 
should be able to learn, i.e., adjust its responses over time so as to provide the right 
environments for its users as and when those users need them. The idea that some 
sort of capacity to learn is a necessary condition for a building to be intelligent is one 
way of separating out the intelligent building concept from closely related notions, 
such as those of responsive architecture and kinetic architecture. The term 
‘responsive architecture’ applies to buildings that have the ability to respond to the 
needs of users. The term ‘kinetic architecture’ applies to ‚buildings, or building 
components, with variable location or mobility, and/or variable geometry or 
movement‛ (Fox and Yeh, p.2). Thus the variability involved in kinetic architecture 
may involve nothing more than opening a door or window, but it may involve 
moving a major structure which, in the limit, may be the whole building.  The key 
thought behind the ‘separating out’ move here is that not all responsive buildings, 
and not all kinetic buildings, qualify as intelligent, since in some cases the 
responsiveness and/or the kinetic properties of those buildings will be the result of 
‘unintelligent’ processes such as direct, unmodifiable links between sensors and 
motors (cf. the idea that genuine intelligence in animals and humans requires more 
than hard-wired stimulus-response connections). Learning is one way to secure the 
right kind of ‘inner’ mediation.  
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Against this conceptual backdrop, consider four examples of actual, planned and 
exploratory buildings that are arrayed along a spectrum from mere 
responsive/kinetic architecture to intelligent architecture.  
 
 Built in 1994, the Heliotrope, designed by Rolf Disch, is a kinetic building in 
Freiburg that, using solar trackers, rotates so as to follow the sun, thereby 
maximizing its access to solar energy and helping to minimize its heating 
energy demands from other sources. The Heliotrope was the first building in 
the world to create more energy than it uses 
(http://www.rolfdisch.de/files/pdf/RotatableSolarHouse.pdf, last accessed 12 
October 2011).  
 
 The Cybertecture Egg is a projected building, designed by James Law 
Cybertecture, to be located in Mumbai (see ‘projects’ at 
http://www.jameslawcybertecture.com/, last accessed 12 October 2011). The 
building combines various intelligent, interactive and multimedia systems to 
create an adapted and adaptable environment. Here are two examples: the 
bathrooms contain a system that monitors and records certain data indicative 
of the inhabitants’ health (e.g. blood pressure, weight), data which may later 
be recovered and forwarded to a doctor; the inhabitants’ working spaces may 
be customized to optimize individual experience (e.g., the actual view can be 
replaced by real-time virtual scenery retrieved from all over the world).  
 
 Taking on the challenge of creating buildings in which the elderly can 
continue to live at home, the Ambient Assisted Living Research Department 
at the Fraunhofer Institute for Experimental Software Engineering in 
Kaiserslautern designed an intelligent embedded system that monitors the 
behaviour of a building’s inhabitants, via a network of hidden sensors (see 
e.g. Kleinberger et al. 2009). This network identifies and assesses risk 
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situations (e.g. someone having a fall), and reports to a control centre, 
allowing, say, the automatic notification of a designated contact. In addition, 
various intelligent systems autonomously modify the environment to reduce 
risk. Thus the bathroom has a toilet that recognizes the user and adjusts itself 
to be at the appropriate height, and a mirror with illuminated pictograms that 
are designed to structure the activities of easily confused occupants by, for 
instance, guiding them to brush their teeth, wash, or take medication. 
 
 In the exploratory architectural project Evolving Sonic Environment, developed 
by Haque and Davis (reported in Haque 2006; see also 
http://www.haque.co.uk/evolvingsonicenvironment.php/, last accessed 13 
October 2011), people walk around inside an acoustically-coupled 
‘spatialized’ neural network (a spatial web of interconnected simple 
processing units). The movements of the occupants (detected via sound) affect 
the organization of the network (the architectural environment) through the 
operation of local learning algorithms active at each of its nodes. This results 
in the network adapting over time to different patterns of occupancy, often 
developing perceptual categories for reflecting those patterns that do not 
necessarily correspond to categories that the human observer would employ.  
 
Now that we have intelligent architecture in view, we can investigate the relations 
between such architecture and ExC.  Here is one way of asking the key question: can 
the embedded systems in the walls and basements of intelligent buildings ever 
become constituent elements in the functionally specified material vehicles that 
realize the thoughts of those buildings’ inhabitants? Put another way, could the 
sequence of dynamically assembled, organic-technological hybrid systems that 
instantiates my mind ever include factors embedded in the intelligent buildings in 
which I will increasingly dwell? To provide an answer here, I shall explore two lines 
of thought.      
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One factor that sometimes figures in discussions of ExC is the portability of cognitive 
resources. Indeed, it is sometimes suggested that a material element may count as 
the vehicle, or as part of the vehicle, of a thinker’s cognitive state or process, only if 
that thinker carries, or at least is able to carry, the element in question around with 
her. In the language of section 2 (above), the portable-nonportable distinction marks 
a functional difference that matters when one is deciding whether or not a particular 
functional contribution to intelligent behaviour counts as cognitive. Neural resources 
manifestly meet the proposed portability constraint. So too do PDAs and 
smartphones. Intelligent architecture, however, doesn’t. So, if portability is a 
keystone requirement for a resource to be awarded cognitive status, then intelligent 
buildings are ‘no more than’ adaptive scaffolds for richly coupled embodied-
embedded minds, not vehicles for extended minds. But is portability what matters 
here? I don’t think so. What really matters is a property in relation to which 
portability makes a positive enabling contribution, but which may be secured 
without portability. That property is somewhat difficult to specify precisely, but, 
roughly speaking, it amounts to a kind of dynamic reliability in which access to the 
externally located resource under consideration is, for the most part, smooth and 
stable just when, and for as long as, that resource is relevant to some aspect of our 
ongoing activity. The qualifier ‘dynamic’ here reflects the fact that, according to ExC, 
the organism-centred hybrid systems that are assembled through the recruitment 
and divestment of technology often persist only when, and as long as, they are 
contextually relevant, meaning that the external resources concerned need not be 
smoothly and stably accessible at other times.  
 
We can now state a modified condition for cognitive status: a material element may 
count as the vehicle, or as part of the vehicle, of a cognitive state or process, only if it 
meets the foregoing dynamic reliability constraint. And although carrying an item of 
technology around with you is certainly one assisting factor here, it is certainly not 
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mandatory. Technological resources embedded in the fabric of one’s house may well 
be readily and reliably available whenever the human behaviour that they support is 
operative. Consider, for example, the activity-structuring pictograms embedded in 
the mirrors of the ambient assisted living environment described earlier. When 
functioning in a hitch-free manner, access to these externally located resources will 
be smooth and stable just when, and for as long as, those resources are relevant to 
the activity they are designed to support. To be clear, meeting the dynamic reliability 
constraint in this way is clearly not a sufficient condition for a technological resource 
to count as part of one’s cognitive architecture. But, if it is a necessary condition, 
then intelligent architecture may certainly, in principle, meet it. 
 
Time, then, to turn to the second ExC-and-intelligent-architecture related issue that I 
want to broach here. Part of the interest of the final example of intelligent 
architecture described above, namely Evolving Sonic Environment by Haque and 
Davis, is that it foregrounds the already highlighted incorporation of learning into 
intelligent architecture. But the Haque and Davis study does more than that. It also 
introduces a new consideration, that of interaction. Haque (2006) argues that an 
important transformation in our relations with architecture occurs when we shift 
from a merely reactive kind of architecture to a genuinely interactive kind.  
 
Here Haque draws a distinction between single-loop interaction, in which the 
architectural response to a particular user-input is determined in advance, and 
multiple-loop interaction, in which the next response, by the architecture or user, is 
in part determined by an ongoing history of  interaction and on the fact that each is 
able to access and modify each other’s goals. As Haque puts it:   
 
[S]ingle-loop devices that satisfy our creature comforts are useful for 
functional goals (I am thinking here of Bill Gate's technologically-
saturated mansion; or building management systems that seek to optimise 
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sunlight distribution; or thermostats that regulate internal temperature). 
Such systems satisfy very particular efficiency criteria that are determined 
during, and limited by, the design process. However, if one wants 
occupants of a building to have the sensation of agency and of 
contributing to the organisation of a building, then the most stimulating 
and potentially productive situation would be a [multi-loop] system in 
which people build up their spaces through ‚conversations‛ with the 
environment, where the history of interactions builds new possibilities for 
sharing goals and sharing outcomes. (Haque, 2006, p.3) 
 
To put flesh (or perhaps concrete) on this goal of human-architecture 
conversation, Haque introduces his notion of Paskian Systems (named after the 
great maverick British cyberneticist, Gordon Pask). Paskian systems eschew the 
usual logic of the interaction between humans and smart technology. 
According to that usual logic, either the human user needs an appropriate 
understanding of the design of the machine, so that she can tell it what to do, or 
the machine needs an appropriate understanding of the design of the human 
user, so that it can provide her with precisely what she needs. A Paskian 
system, by contrast, would support a kind of open dialogue. Thus, for example, 
in an spatial dwelling context, such a system ‚would provide us with a method 
for comparing our conception of spatial conditions with the designed 
machine’s conception of the space‛ (Haque 2006, p.3).  
 
There is a compelling consideration which suggests that although the kind of non-
Paskian architectural technology that we encountered earlier (recall, again, the 
mirror-embedded pictograms) may qualify as proper parts of the dweller’s cognitive 
economy, on roughly the same grounds as mobile computing technology (e.g. 
among other things, both meet the dynamic reliability constraint), Haque’s Paskian 
systems, and thus the realizations of such systems in intelligent architecture, will fail 
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so to qualify. In fact, the threat to ExC here is established by the very conditions that 
make possible the capacity of Paskian systems to enter into richly interactive 
dialogues, the feature of those systems that secures Haque’s advocacy of them in 
architectural design. Paskian systems may operate with categorizations, conceptions, 
and models of goal-states to be achieved – beliefs about how the dweller’s world is 
and should be, if you will – that diverge from those of their human users. Thus, as 
mentioned earlier, the Evolving Sonic Environment develops perceptual categories for 
occupancy patterns that do not necessarily correspond to human-determined 
categories. It is this divergence that grounds the dialogical structure that 
characterizes the kind of rich human-building interaction sought by Haque.  Now, 
this may well be exactly what we want from intelligent architecture, but the 
divergence calls into question any claim that the human-technology interactive 
system so instantiated is itself a single, integrated cognitive system. We would 
experience the same hesitation to think in terms of extended cognition if we were 
confronted by a Paskian smartphone that negotiated over where to go every time its 
online navigation program was fired up. And the same qualms indicate why the 
elevator designed by the Sirius Cybernetics Corporation (see above) is not plausibly 
considered part of Zaphod’s mind.  
 
The root issue here is that Paskian systems exhibit a kind of agency. This agency, 
however limited, prevents them from being incorporated into the cognitive systems 
that are centred on their human users. As one might put it, where there’s more than 
one will, there’s no way to cognitive extension. At first sight, this principle would 
seem to have negative implications (implications that I do not have the space to 
unravel or explore here) for the hypothesis of socially extended cognition, interpreted 
as the claim that some of the material vehicles that realize my thinking may be 
located inside the brains of other people (i.e., other agents). For the present, 
however, my thoughts are restricted to the domain of intelligent architecture: if 
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intelligent architecture does support ExC, then it is on the basis not of Paskian 
interaction, but of the dynamic reliability established by non-Paskian loops.     
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The extended cognition hypothesis is currently the subject of much debate in 
philosophical and cognitive-scientific circles, but its implications stretch far beyond 
the metaphysics and science of minds. We have only just begun, it seems, to scratch 
the surface of the wider social and cultural ramifications of the view. If our minds 
are partly in our smartphones and even our buildings, then that is not a 
transformation in human nature, but only the latest manifestation of the age-old 
human ontology of dynamically assembled, organic-technological cognitive systems. 
Nevertheless, once our self-understanding catches up with our hybrid nature, the 
world promises to be a very different place.  
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